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INTRODUCTION 
In constitutional and other public law cases in recent years concerning a wide 
range of controversial issues, public attention has focused not only on the courts’ 
legal conclusions, but also on the scope of their rulings—in particular, whether 
a single district court judge sought to enforce his or her interpretation of the law 
across the country through a nationwide injunction.1 For example, in Texas v. 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Barry University School of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on 
Law, Harvard Law School, 2012-2014; J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; A.B., Princeton 
University, 2000. This Article grew out of conversations with William Baude, Sam Bray, 
Maureen Carroll, Jack Goldsmith, and Jamelle Sharpe. I am grateful to Joe Mead for his 
valuable feedback on an earlier draft, as well as to Doug Rendleman, Caprice Roberts, and 
other scholars who attended the remedies panel at the AALS 2017 Annual Meeting and the 
works-in-progress panel at the 2017 Federalist Society Annual Faculty Conference for their 
helpful questions and comments. 
1 See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Conservative Legal Tactic Could Imperil Clinton Agenda, 
POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/states-federal-
judges-injuctions-government-228234 [https://perma.cc/AFJ3-7T36] (explaining that the 
practice of federal judges issuing broad, often nationwide, injunctions in federal government 
actions has thwarted many key parts of President Obama’s agenda, and “some aspects of 
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United States,2 the District Court for the Northern District of Texas entered a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from enforcing new 
guidance from the U.S. Department of Education, concerning transgender 
students’ right to use the bathrooms of their choice, against any school in the 
nation.3 The case was filed on behalf of a coalition of several states, but was not 
a class action.4  
Conversely, when the District Court for the District of Columbia determined 
that it was unconstitutional for the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to collect 
metadata about every phone call made in the country (including the phone 
number dialed, as well as the date, time, and duration of the call), it enjoined the 
NSA from collecting such information only concerning the five individual 
plaintiffs in the case.5 
Disputes over the proper scope of injunctive relief repeatedly arose in 
challenges relating to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
as they made their way to the Supreme Court.6 In Halbig v. Burwell,7 the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) regulation8 providing subsidies to people who purchase health 
insurance through exchanges established by the federal government was 
invalid.9 The plaintiffs, all from states in which the federal government had 
 
Hillary Clinton’s platform”). 
2 No. 7:16-CV-00054-O, 2016 WL 4426495 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2016). 
3 Id. at *1 (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibits various agency 
officials from enforcing an order requiring schools to “immediately allow students to use the 
bathrooms, locker rooms and showers of the student’s choosing, or risk losing Title IX-linked 
funding”). 
4 Id. (“Plaintiffs are composed of 13 states and agencies represented by various state 
leaders . . . .”). 
5 Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 179, 198 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated as moot, 
appeal dismissed, No. 15-5307, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6190 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2016) (per 
curiam); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2013) (enjoining the 
Government from collecting metadata just from the two plaintiffs’ accounts through the 
NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Program), injunction and stay granted, No. 13-0851, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177169 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013), rev’d, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
6 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
7 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 17099, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (en banc), dismissed, No. 14-5018 2015 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16286, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2015) (en banc). 
8 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(a)(l) (2016) (describing the eligibility for tax credits for individuals 
who are enrolled in a qualified health plan through an Exchange). 
9 Halbig, 758 F.3d at 412 (“[S]ection 36B unambiguously forecloses the interpretation 
embodied in the IRS Rule and instead limits the availability of premium tax credits to state-
established Exchanges.”). The court held that the subsidies violated the ACA, which provided 
that only people who purchased health insurance through an exchange “established by [a] 
State” qualified for a subsidy. Id. at 411. The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in a parallel case from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
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established exchanges, wished to avoid receiving subsidies so they would not 
become subject to the ACA’s individual mandate to purchase health insurance, 
as well as employers in such states who did not wish to offer it.10 The court 
“vacate[d] the IRS’s regulation” and precluded its application to anyone, 
anywhere in the nation.11  
In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health and Human 
Services,12 in contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of Florida held 
that the ACA’s individual mandate exceeded Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause and was not severable from the rest of the statute.13 The court 
declined to issue an injunction against the ACA, however, on the basis that 
“declaratory relief is adequate and separate injunctive relief is not necessary.”14 
The recent change in presidential administrations, from President Obama to 
President Trump, vividly illustrates how activities from both sides of the 
 
Circuit. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (concluding that “Section 36B allows 
tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under the [Affordable Care] 
Act,” based on the Court’s interpretation of congressional intent). 
10 Halbig, 758 F.3d at 393. The court held the individuals had standing to challenge the 
regulation because the ACA imposed penalties on anyone who refused to purchase health 
insurance, and could do so for less than eight percent of their projected household income, 
taking into account any tax credits or subsidies the ACA provides. Id. at 395-96 (citing 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(l)(A)-(B) (2012)). Without the challenged subsidy, the plaintiffs’ incomes 
would have been too low to subject them to penalties for refusing to purchase health insurance. 
Id. at 396 (“[B]ut for federal credits [the plaintiff] would be exempt from the individual 
mandate because the unsubsidized cost of coverage would exceed eight percent of his 
income.”). They had standing to challenge the validity of the subsidy on the grounds that its 
availability subjected them to those penalties. Id. Comparable penalties for employers 
likewise hinged on the availability of the subsidies. Id. at 395. 
11 Id. at 394; see also Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v. Burwell, 827 F.3d 70, 73, 75 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (affirming permanent injunction invalidating ACA regulations prohibiting people from 
purchasing “stand-alone fixed indemnity plans”). The D.C. Circuit vacated the Halbig 
injunction when it ordered en banc rehearing, Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 17099, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (en banc), and later dismissed the case 
following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell. Halbig, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16286, at 
*3 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2015) (en banc). 
12 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), clarified by 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
13 Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1298, 1305-07. The District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia similarly held that the individual mandated violated the Commerce Clause but 
declined to issue an injunction. Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 
2d 768, 788, 798 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, remanded, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
14 Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. The Commerce Clause challenge was brought by: 
individuals who did not wish to purchase health insurance; the National Federation of 
Independent Business, which asserted associational standing on behalf of its members who 
similarly did not wish to purchase health insurance, and two states that had enacted laws 
declaring that the mandate violated citizens’ rights. Id. at 1270-73. 
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political spectrum may take advantage of nationwide injunctions. A single judge 
from the District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered a nationwide 
preliminary injunction completely prohibiting the Obama Administration from 
enforcing its Deferred Action for Parents of Aliens (“DAPA”) program and 
expanding its Deferred Action for Children of Aliens (“DACA”) program.15 
These programs would have suspended the deportation of various classes of 
undocumented immigrants and authorized them to work legally in the United 
States.16 The lawsuit challenging the programs was filed by a coalition of 
twenty-six plaintiff states, but was not a class action.17 An equally divided 
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the injunction.18 
Similarly, at the outset of the Trump Administration, the states of Washington 
and Minnesota obtained a nationwide injunction against President Trump’s 
executive order19 temporarily prohibiting people from certain terror-prone 
countries from entering the United States.20 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that such nationwide relief was appropriate because a “fragmented 
immigration policy would run afoul of the constitutional and statutory 
requirement for uniform immigration law and policy.”21  
Controversies concerning the proper scope of lower courts’ powers in 
resolving constitutional, statutory, and administrative cases have long been 
neglected in both academic literature and public debate.22 Lower courts, 
 
15 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677-78 & n.111 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“[T]his temporary injunction 
enjoins the implementation of the DAPA program that awards legal presence and additional 
benefits to the four million or more individuals potentially covered by the DAPA 
Memorandum and to the three expansions/additions to the DACA program . . . .”), aff’d 809 
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), reh’g denied, No. 15-674, 2016 U.S. 
LEXIS 4754 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016). 
16 Id. at 608-14. 
17 Id. at 607-08. 
18 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
19 E.O. 13,769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 
82 FED. REG. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
20 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017), stay denied, No. 17-35101, 2017 WL 526497 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam). 
21 Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35101, 2017 WL 526497, at *9 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) 
(per curiam). The impact of orders of varying breadth from federal district and circuit courts 
throughout the nation also contributed to substantial uncertainty on the path to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling upholding the right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2591 (2015). For a comprehensive and illuminating history of the procedural and 
remedial aspects of this litigation, see Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process 
of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 243 (2016). 
22 For articles specifically addressing the proper scope of district courts’ remedial powers, 
see Morley, supra note 25, at 553 (arguing that courts should require a case to proceed as a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class action if it determines that it would have to grant relief to all right holders, 
rather than just the particular plaintiffs in a case), and see also Maureen Carroll, Aggregation 
for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO 
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however, address most important legal issues long before they reach the 
Supreme Court. Due to both the Supreme Court’s limited adjudicative capacity 
and its stringent requirements for granting certiorari,23 many important rulings 
of the lower courts may persist for years before the Supreme Court reviews 
them.24 Moreover, because many critical decisions concerning the scope of relief 
in a case are discretionary,25 the district court’s determinations are particularly 
important in determining the consequences of a case. 
 
L. REV. 2017, 2030-34 (2015); Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second 
Opinions: Protecting the Government’s Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide 
Class Actions Against the Federal Government, 31 REV. LITIG. 943, 995 (2012); Timothy 
Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 
597, 637 (1983); Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety 
of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1134 (2005). 
As a result of the Social Security Administration’s general refusal during the Reagan 
Administration to apply circuit court rulings to people living within that circuit, other than the 
parties immediately involved in a case, a body of literature arose examining agency 
nonacquiescence in lower court rulings. See, e.g., Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, 
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to 
Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 821 (1990) (arguing that courts have the final word 
on whether an “agency has complied with its statutory mandate”); Samuel Estreicher & 
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 
683 (1989) (arguing that nonacquiescence can be justified “as an interim measure that allows 
the agency to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute at the agency level, 
and only while federal law on the subject remains in flux”); Deborah Maranville, 
Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. 
L. REV. 471 (1986) (analyzing the doctrinal approaches to nonacquiescense); Joshua I. 
Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 1815, 1819, 1821-35 (1989) (suggesting that divergent opinions regarding “the 
lawfulness of nonacquiescence reflect an underlying separation of powers question about the 
justification for administrative agency adjudication”). The issue largely faded from view in 
the decades that followed. Other commentators have debated the legal effects of judicial 
rulings and whether other branches of government are required to follow them. See infra note 
156 and accompanying text (giving an explanation for the deference owed to a trial court on 
appeal); see also Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 
12 NEV. L.J. 787, 794-804 (2012). 
23 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
24 Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 84. 
25 District courts have broad discretion over whether to grant injunctive relief, eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006), and over the terms of any injunction, 
see United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 495 (2001). Courts also 
have discretion over whether to certify plaintiff classes to seek relief and how to determine 
the scope of any such classes, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979), and, in some 
jurisdictions, whether to grant relief to third-party nonlitigants in nonclass cases, see Michael 
T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting 
Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 494 
(2016).  
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This Article offers a new perspective on nationwide injunctions, focusing on 
the proper role within our hierarchical judicial system of the lower courts, which 
exercise jurisdiction over limited geographic areas.26 It contends that the two 
major lines of Supreme Court precedent which establish the scope of lower 
courts’ powers contradict each other in ways that have been previously 
overlooked. When these precedents are untangled, a compelling case emerges 
that nationwide classes should be certified, and nationwide injunctions granted, 
in constitutional and statutory challenges to federal statutes, regulations, and 
other policies—if at all—only under certain narrow circumstances. 
It is important to begin by clarifying the meaning of the phrase “nationwide 
injunction” as used in this Article. In one sense, most federal injunctions could 
be considered “nationwide” because the defendant is generally prohibited from 
violating the plaintiff’s rights anywhere—not just within the geographic 
jurisdiction of the issuing court.27 When a federal court enjoins a defendant from 
infringing a plaintiff’s patent, for example, the defendant may not manufacture 
infringing goods anywhere in the nation.28 So long as an injunction is adequately 
tailored to prevent violations of the plaintiff’s rights, concerns about its 
geographic scope are unlikely to arise.29  
The phrase “nationwide injunction” also may refer to a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction: an order issued by a federal court in a case brought by individual 
plaintiffs or entities (i.e., a nonclass case) completely prohibiting a defendant 
government agency or official from enforcing an invalidated federal statute, 
regulation, or policy against anyone, anywhere in the nation.30 In cases involving 
indivisible rights, in which it is impossible to enforce only the plaintiffs’ rights 
without also necessarily enforcing other peoples’ rights, such as a redistricting 
or school desegregation case,31 an order crafted to enforce the plaintiffs’ rights 
often will be effectively indistinguishable from a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction.  
Most cases, however, involve divisible rights, in which the court can fully 
enforce particular plaintiffs’ rights without necessarily enforcing third parties’ 
 
26 Much of the analysis in this Article is equally applicable to state courts. 
27 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) (“[T]he District Court in 
exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts 
outside its territorial jurisdiction.”). 
28 Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452 (1932) (holding that an 
injunction in a patent infringement suit “bound the respondent personally . . . not simply 
within the District of Massachusetts, but throughout the United States”). 
29 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“The remedy must of course be limited 
to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”); see also 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (holding that, in “any 
equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy”). 
30 See Morley, supra note 25, at 490-91. 
31 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(a)-(b) 
(2010) [hereinafter ALI AGGREGATE LIMITATION]. 
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rights. I have argued elsewhere that courts should decline to issue Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions in nonclass cases due to jurisdictional, procedural, and 
other important concerns.32 Rather, a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction, tailored to 
enforcing only the rights of the plaintiffs before the court, is the appropriate type 
of relief in nonclass cases.33 In a challenge to the constitutionality or validity of 
a federal legal provision, the court should determine at the outset of the case 
whether, should the plaintiffs prevail, it would be required to issue a Defendant-
Oriented Injunction due to Equal Protection, severability, or other restrictions.34 
If a Defendant-Oriented injunction would be necessary, the court should require 
the case to proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action;35 otherwise, the case may 
proceed as a nonclass suit in which the plaintiffs may seek a Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction.36 This principle raises the question of how broadly the Rule 23(b)(2) 
class should be defined—whether it should include all right holders in the 
judicial district, circuit, or nation.37 
Finally, “nationwide injunction” may refer to an injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or policy in a case in which a 
nationwide class of all right holders has been certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 
When a plaintiff class is comprised of all right holders, a Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction focused on protecting the plaintiffs’ rights is effectively equivalent to 
a Defendant-Oriented Injunction completely barring the government defendants 
from enforcing the challenged provision. This Article examines nationwide 
injunctions in this sense of the term. Because courts must ensure that an 
injunction is sufficiently broad to protect the plaintiffs’ rights, the validity of a 
nationwide injunction in this sense of the phrase depends on the propriety of 
certifying a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2). This Article treats these issues 
as inextricably intertwined.  
This Article explores problems with nationwide injunctions from three 
different, though related, perspectives. Part I begins by explaining that 
nationwide injunctions are inconsistent with the structure of the federal judicial 
system. This Part examines the largely unrecognized inconsistencies between 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Califano v. Yamasaki,38 which held that a single 
district court judge may enforce his or her view of the law across the nation by 
certifying a nationwide class of plaintiffs to challenge a federal regulation,39 and 
United States v. Mendoza,40 in which the Court substantially limited the res 
 
32 Morley, supra note 25, at 494-97. 
33 See supra note 29; see also Morley, supra note 25, at 550-53. 
34 Morley, supra note 25, 553-56. 
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
36 Morley, supra note 25, at 553. 
37 Id. at 555-56. 
38 442 U.S. 682, 706 (1979). 
39 Id. at 701-02 (explaining that the district court “has the discretion . . . to certify a class 
action for the litigation”). 
40 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
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judicata effect of lower courts’ judgments in public law cases by prohibiting 
third parties from invoking nonmutual collateral estoppel against the 
Government.41 This Part shows that the same structural considerations 
underlying Mendoza should lead the Court to reconsider Califano’s approval of 
nationwide classes.  
Part II assesses the issue through the lens of class action law. Class 
certification is merely a procedural vehicle for aggregating numerous plaintiffs’ 
claims and should not change the body of substantive law used to adjudicate 
them. This Part explains that, when a district court certifies a nationwide class 
in a challenge to a federal statute, regulation, or policy, it generally applies the 
binding precedents of its own circuit to adjudicate the claims of all right holders 
across the nation. Certifying a nationwide class in such cases therefore deprives 
both the government and residents of other circuits of their respective rights to 
have those persons’ claims be adjudicated according to the law of their 
respective circuits. This Part further demonstrates that Rule 23’s standards and 
procedures for certifying classes in suits for injunctive relief are almost 
completely inapposite for determining whether a district court’s legal rulings 
should be given nationwide effect.  
Part III focuses on the powers of district courts themselves. It begins by 
exploring the three main components of a judicial ruling: judgments, 
injunctions, and opinions. This Part contends that, in light of the strict limitations 
on the geographic enforceability of lower courts’ opinions as a matter of stare 
decisis, there is no basis for allowing those courts to give the legal conclusions 
contained within those opinions the force of law throughout the country by 
certifying nationwide classes.  
Part IV offers a new approach to nationwide class certification and nationwide 
injunctions, arguing that such relief should be treated as presumptively 
inappropriate. It identifies four situations in which a nationwide class may 
potentially be defensible: (1) the plaintiffs are asserting rights that are “clearly 
established” by Supreme Court precedents and about which reasonable jurists 
cannot differ; (2) the plaintiffs assert indivisible rights; (3) the plaintiffs’ claims 
are based on the allegedly unconstitutional burdens the challenged provisions 
impose; or (4) it would be inappropriate to enjoin the challenged provision only 
against certain right holders under traditional severability standards. 
This Article seeks to initiate a new conversation concerning the proper scope 
of lower courts’ remedial powers. This Article is my fourth piece examining this 
issue. I began by arguing that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a lower court’s 
decision about whether to issue an injunction has a tremendous effect on the 
impact and efficacy of its ruling, particularly in public law cases where a right 
holder faces exhaustion requirements for seeking judicial relief or “fast-moving” 
 
41 Id. at 162 (holding that “nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply 
against the Government in such a way as to preclude relitigation of issues such as those 
involved in this case” in part because the economy interests that normally justify collateral 
estoppel are “outweighed by the constraints which peculiarly affect the Government”). 
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constitutional violations.42 I advocated eliminating unnecessary or arbitrary 
barriers to the availability of injunctive relief. My next work examined the 
circumstances under which courts may issue injunctions, offering suggestions 
for reform.43 Building on these pieces, I then explored challenges posed by 
courts that issue statewide or nationwide injunctions outside the context of class 
action cases, even when such broad relief is unnecessary to remedy the harm to 
the particular plaintiffs before them.44 This Article takes the next step, exploring 
the scope of a lower court’s power to certify a nationwide class and issue a 
nationwide injunction. 
I. THE ROLE OF LOWER COURTS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The propriety of nationwide injunctions is primarily a structural issue 
concerning the proper role of lower courts of limited geographic jurisdiction 
within a hierarchical judiciary. The Supreme Court has offered conflicting 
visions of the proper structure of the federal judiciary that complicates the 
question. On the one hand, in Califano, the Court embraced a sweeping view of 
lower courts’ powers, authorizing them to certify nationwide classes in 
challenges to federal legal provisions.45 Yet only a few years later, in Mendoza, 
the Court emphasized the need to limit the effects of district court rulings by 
prohibiting plaintiffs from asserting nonmutual collateral estoppel against the 
Government.46 The Court has neither recognized nor resolved the tension 
between these lines of authority. The concerns identified in Mendoza, however, 
call into question Califano’s embrace of nationwide class certification. 
 
42 See generally Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the 
Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453 (2014) (arguing that “a constitutional or statutory 
right receives the greatest available level of protection when it is secured by an injunction” 
and, particularly in public law cases where injunctions are highly important, the plaintiff’s 
path to injunctive relief should be made easier by relaxing nonmerits requirements for 
injunctive relief). 
43 See generally Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable 
Balancing Under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177 (arguing 
that “the standard governing the issuance of injunctions for statutory violations, including in 
the civil rights context, should depend on the nature of the injunction the plaintiff seeks”). 
44 See generally Morley, supra note 25 (explaining that courts should be careful in 
determining the scope of a judgment, particularly in constitutional cases, to avoid 
“inappropriately providing ‘overrelief’ to plaintiffs in nonclass cases” and offering potential 
approaches to guide courts in crafting proper remedies). 
45 Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“Nothing in Rule 23, however, limits 
the geographical scope of a class action that is brought in conformity with that Rule.”). 
46 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
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A. Califano and Nationwide Class Certification 
Califano expressly affirmed the power of district courts to issue nationwide 
injunctions against federal agencies.47 The plaintiffs alleged that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) to provide claimants with the opportunity for an oral hearing before 
reducing their benefits to recoup overpayments.48 The district court certified a 
nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2)49 “comprised of ‘all individuals eligible 
for [old-age and survivors’ benefits] whose benefits have been or will be reduced 
or otherwise adjusted without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.’”50 
The Supreme Court upheld certification of the nationwide class.51 It began by 
observing that Rule 23, which authorizes class certification, applies in 
challenges to executive actions.52 “[T]he class-action device,” the Court 
observed, “saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting 
an issue potentially affecting every [claimant] to be litigated in an economical 
fashion under Rule 23.”53 The Court further observed that a nationwide class of 
all potentially affected claimants is consistent with “principles of equity 
jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief [remains] dictated by the 
extent of the violation established,” regardless of the “geographic extent of the 
plaintiff class.”54  
The SSA had objected that certifying a nationwide class would “foreclose[] 
reasoned consideration of the same issues by other federal courts and artificially 
increase[] the pressure on the docket of th[e] Court.”55 The Court acknowledged 
that “nationwide class actions may have a detrimental effect by foreclosing 
adjudication by a number of different courts and judges, and of increasing, in 
 
47 Califano, 442 U.S. at 705 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by 
granting nationwide injunctive relief against a federal agency). 
48 Id. (“[Plaintiffs] alleged that the Secretary’s recoupment procedures were contrary to 
both § 204 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They requested . . . 
declaratory and mandamus relief that would require the Secretary to provide notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing before recoupment began again.”). 
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (authorizing class certification when Rule 23(a)’s requirements 
are satisfied and “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole”). 
50 Califano, 442 U.S. at 689 (alterations in original). The class excluded residents of two 
states in which similar classes had been certified on a statewide basis. Id. 
51 Id. at 706. 
52 Id. at 700 (“In the absence [express Congressional intent] . . . class relief is appropriate 
in civil actions brought in federal court, including those seeking to overturn determinations of 
the departments of the Executive Branch of the Government . . . .”). 
53 Id. at 701. 
54 Id. at 702. 
55 Id. at 701-02. 
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certain cases, the pressures on this Court’s docket.”56 It nevertheless refused “to 
adopt the extreme position that such a [nationwide] class may never be 
certified.”57  
Califano offers scant guidance to lower courts for determining the propriety 
of nationwide class certification when a plaintiff challenges a federal statute, 
regulation, or policy. The Court recognized that “[i]t often will be preferable to 
allow several courts to pass on a given claim in order to gain the benefit of 
adjudication by different courts in different factual contexts.”58 It directed lower 
courts to “take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate,” and 
that “certification . . . would not improperly interfere with the litigation of 
similar issues in other judicial districts.”59 It nevertheless emphasized that Rule 
23 grants district courts broad discretion over the proper scope of classes, and 
did not identify any other factors district courts should weigh when determining 
the “appropriate” scope of a class.60  
Califano’s approval of nationwide classes allows a single district court to 
enforce its view of the law throughout the entire nation. A court may compel the 
Government to apply a legal provision in a particular manner, or prohibit it from 
enforcing the provision at all, with regard to any potentially affected person, 
including those who live in other judicial districts and even other circuits. 
Everyone potentially affected by the challenged provision is bound by the 
district court’s ruling as a matter of res judicata because, as members of a 
plaintiff class, they are parties to the lawsuit.61 Paradoxically, despite the 
potentially dramatic and widespread effects of a district court’s ruling, any 
opinion accompanying that ruling lacks any precedential value.62 Applying 
Califano, circuit courts have been most willing to affirm nationwide classes and 
injunctions in challenges to regulations concerning federal benefits such as 
Social Security and Medicare.63 
 
56 Id. at 702. 
57 Id. at 702-03. 
58 Id. at 702. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 702-03. 
61 Cooper v. Fed. Res. Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (“[A] judgment in a properly 
entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation.”); 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (“[T]he judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ 
suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those 
represented who were not made parties to it.”). As discussed below, putative class members 
generally are not permitted to opt out of classes seeking injunctive or declaratory relief under 
Rule 23(b)(2). See infra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining that, because notice to 
putative class members is optional under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), they are not given an 
opportunity to opt out); see also Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opts Outs, and 
the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 605 (2015). 
62 See infra Section III.C (explaining that district court opinions lack precedential value). 
63 See, e.g., Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 1987); Barnett v. Brown, 794 
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One of the main reasons courts issue nationwide injunctions is to protect the 
rights of all similarly situated right holders. The Equal Protection Clause64 and 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause65 
generally prohibit the government from discriminating among people with 
regard to their fundamental constitutional rights.66 Some commentators have 
argued that allowing a court to issue injunctions or declaratory judgments 
enforcing constitutional rights only for the particular plaintiffs in a case and not 
other, similarly situated right holders would violate these equal protection 
restrictions.67 Congress generally may not enact laws allowing only certain 
people to exercise their constitutional rights or establishing special remedies for 
violations of certain people’s rights based solely on where they live. The 
Constitution arguably should not be read as permitting courts to effectively 
create such a scheme by extending injunctive relief only to particular plaintiffs, 
or giving only certain parties the benefit of their interpretation of the law.68 
Under this view, the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection restrictions bind all 
branches of the federal government equally. 
This argument proves far too much, however. If valid, it would render 
unconstitutional the structure of the judicial system, in which power is shared 
among coordinate courts of limited geographic jurisdiction. Any time a court 
 
F.2d 17, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1986); Pope v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 672 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
65 Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment implicitly incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
restrictions). 
66 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) (“[W]here fundamental 
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might 
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”). 
67 See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 22, at 825-27 (explaining that agency intracircuit 
nonacquiescence to judicial rulings creates equal protection and due process issues because it 
causes disparities between claimants in different jurisdictions); Samuel Figler, Executive 
Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664, 1675 (1993) 
(“Critics of intracircuit nonacquiescence also assert that the practice violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”). 
68 Cf. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he arbitrary 
distinctions created by the Secretary’s non-acquiescence policy, regarding those claimants 
who obtain a disability determination in accordance with circuit court precedents and those 
claimants who do not, cast serious doubts on the validity of the Secretary’s non-acquiescence 
policy.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 
1986); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that a “dual system 
of law,” in which an agency refuses to apply judicial rulings beyond the parties to a case, “is 
prejudicial and unfair”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984). 
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invalidated (or perhaps even interpreted) a statute or regulation, the ruling would 
have to be applied throughout the nation in order to avoid equal protection 
violations. Under this view, not only is Mendoza69 wrong, but the opposite 
conclusion is constitutionally compelled, at least in constitutional cases: third-
party nonlitigants must be able to assert nonmutual collateral estoppel against 
the Government, to prevent the court in which they are litigating from reaching 
a different legal conclusion and violating their right to equal protection under 
the law.70 Equal protection, however, has never been understood as requiring 
instant nationwide application of every district court constitutional ruling.71 
Moreover, Califano itself did not mention equal protection concerns. 
Consequently, it appears unlikely that nationwide injunctions are necessary to 
avoid equal protection problems in challenges—including constitutional 
challenges—to the validity of federal statutes, regulations, or policies.  
B. Mendoza and Restricting the Power of Lower Courts  
Mendoza, decided only a few years after Califano, offers a starkly different 
assessment of the proper role of lower courts in the federal judicial system. 
Mendoza held that, when a federal court decides an issue adversely to the 
Government—including constitutional and statutory issues—the ruling binds 
the Government as a matter of res judicata only with regard to the other litigants 
in that case.72 The Government is not bound by that ruling in subsequent cases 
 
69 See infra Section I.B. 
70 See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 22, at 733 (“This litigant equality argument, in its 
strong form, would doom not only intracircuit nonacquiescence but also other features of our 
legal system where differential access to litigation resources may spell different outcomes.”). 
71 Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1828 n.37 (pointing out that “[c]urrent case law provides 
scant support at best” for an equal protection argument). Indeed, comparable equal protection 
issues would arise when some state courts enforced federal constitutional rights that other 
state courts refused to recognize. 
72 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163 (1984) (“The doctrine of res judicata . . . 
prevents the Government from relitigating the same cause of action against the parties to a 
prior decision . . . .”); see also 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD 
H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4465.4 (2d ed. 2002) (“[A] seemingly 
broad rule prohibiting use of nonmutual offensive preclusion against the government was 
announced in United States v. Mendoza.”); cf. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.04[2][c][v] (3d ed. 2016) (suggesting that nonmutual collateral 
estoppel may be available against the Government in certain types of cases). 
The Supreme Court previously had held that the Government is subject to mutual collateral 
estoppel, meaning that it generally is precluded from relitigating an issue against the same 
litigant, even in a different court. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1979) 
(precluding the government from relitigating an issue that was “determined adversely” to the 
government in a “prior state proceeding”); see also United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 
U.S. 165, 173 (1984) (holding that estoppel applies “where the Government is litigating the 
same issue arising under virtually identical facts against the same party”). The Court 
explained that mutual collateral estoppel arises naturally from a court’s “central . . . purpose” 
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involving other people.73 To the contrary, the Government remains free to 
relitigate against other litigants the same constitutional or statutory issues that it 
previously lost.74 
The Mendoza Court exempted the Government from nonmutual offensive 
collateral estoppel for four main reasons. First, the Government is involved in 
far more litigation than any other entity, and is therefore much more likely to be 
involved in repeat litigation raising the same issues than private parties.75 
Second, the Court wanted to facilitate development of the law. Precluding the 
Government from relitigating lower court rulings in subsequent cases involving 
different litigants “would substantially thwart the development of important 
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal 
issue.”76 It would be impossible for circuit splits to develop on issues, precluding 
 
of conclusively resolving disputes within its jurisdiction. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153. Collateral 
estoppel protects litigants “from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, 
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the 
possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Id. at 153-54 (footnote omitted). 
Mendoza affirmed that the Government is subject to mutual collateral estoppel, despite its 
unique characteristics as a sovereign. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 164. The Court explained that 
mutual collateral estoppel does not raise the same concerns about freezing development of the 
law as its nonmutual analogue because the Government remains free to relitigate issues 
against other parties. Id. Moreover, “estopping the Government spares a party that has already 
prevailed once from having to relitigate.” Id. 
73 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 158 (“[N]onmutual offensive collateral estoppel is not to be 
extended to the United States.”). But see Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: 
Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
847, 848 (1986) (“[A]lthough a rule requiring the application of nonmutual offensive 
collateral estoppel against the government in all cases would be inappropriate, courts should 
have discretion to preclude relitigation whenever they can thereby further the goals of litigant 
equality.”). 
74 Mendoza has been applied to federal agencies and officials sued in their official 
capacities, as well as states, Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Fla., Dep’t of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 
1579 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he rationale outlined by the Supreme Court in Mendoza for not 
applying nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government is equally applicable to state 
governments.”), and state agencies, Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G&T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 
425 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Mendoza’s rationale applies with equal force to [an] 
attempt to assert nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel against [a state agency].” (citing 
Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
75 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159-60 (observing that, because the government is involved in 
more litigation than “even the most litigious private entity[,] . . . the Government is more 
likely than any private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which 
nonetheless involve the same legal issues”); see also id. at 162-63 (“The conduct of 
Government litigation in the courts of the United States is sufficiently different from the 
conduct of private civil litigation in those courts so that what might otherwise be economy 
interests underlying a broad application of collateral estoppel are outweighed by the 
constraints which peculiarly affect the Government.”). 
76 Id. at 160. 
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the Supreme Court from seeing the practical consequences of different possible 
interpretations of the law in different jurisdictions.77  
Third, the Court wanted to protect the Government from having to “appeal 
every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing further review.”78 The Court 
placed great weight on preserving the Government’s discretion to decide 
whether to appeal adverse judgments.79 Mendoza emphasized that “the conduct 
of Government litigation in all its myriad features” is not “a wholly mechanical 
procedure which involves no policy choices whatever.”80 Finally, the Court 
wanted to limit the ability of a presidential administration to bind its successors 
to a particular view of the Constitution or a federal statute based solely on a 
district court ruling. If the Government were subject to nonmutual offensive 
collateral estoppel, one administration would be able to give a district court 
decision nationwide effect simply by declining to appeal it.81 Because “policy 
choices . . . made by one administration” are “often reevaluated by another 
administration, courts should be careful when they seek to apply expanding rules 
of collateral estoppel to Government litigation.”82  
Mendoza and Califano offer squarely conflicting views of the proper scope of 
lower courts’ powers. Mendoza extols the virtues of allowing various courts to 
address an issue so the Supreme Court can see the consequences of different 
possible rules or interpretations before definitively imposing one on a 
nationwide basis. Califano, in contrast, empowers a district court to impose its 
ruling nationally, foreclosing contrary approaches.83 It is primarily concerned 
with securing adequate relief for all adversely affected people and avoiding 
disparities in the enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights.84 Mendoza 
 
77 Id. (“Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it 
receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this 
Court grants certiorari.”). 
78 Id. at 161. 
79 See id. (“[T]he Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited 
resources of the Government and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an 
appeal.”). 
80 Id. at 161. 
81 Id. at 161-62; cf. Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the 
Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 689-91 (2014) (arguing that courts should be cautious in approving 
consent decrees to ensure that a presidential administration does not use them to improperly 
entrench its preferred constitutional interpretations and policies without allowing a court to 
pass on the merits of the underlying issues). 
82 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161-62. 
83 This outcome also occurs when a court does not certify a class, but grants effectively 
classwide relief by issuing a Defendant-Oriented Injunction that completely prohibits the 
government defendants from enforcing the challenged provision against anyone, rather than 
just the plaintiffs in the case. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. 
84 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 339, 350 
(1996) (explaining that affording narrower scopes to court rulings leads to “less uniformity in 
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sought to preserve the Government’s flexibility in determining which cases to 
appeal; Califano effectively compels the Government to appeal every adverse 
ruling by allowing a single trial court to completely bar enforcement of a law or 
regulation throughout the nation. The Mendoza Court also was concerned about 
preventing the executive branch from manipulating the judiciary by declining to 
appeal an adverse ruling so that it would bind the Government, including 
subsequent administrations, in any future litigation anywhere in the nation. But 
Califano allows for that result. If the Government declines to appeal a ruling in 
a case involving a nationwide plaintiff class, a legal provision may be 
completely invalidated across the entire country. 
Mendoza’s rejection of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel enables 
federal agencies to engage in intercircuit nonacquiescence. “[A]n agency 
engages in intercircuit nonacquiescence when it refuses to follow, in its 
administrative proceedings, the case law of a court of appeals other than the one 
that will review the agency’s decision.”85 Scholars who have studied the issue 
have almost unanimously concluded that intercircuit nonacquiescence is both 
constitutionally permissible and consistent with the structure of the federal court 
system and limited powers of lower courts. 
Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz have argued that, “[g]iven the lack of 
intercircuit stare decisis, and the reasons underlying our system of intercircuit 
dialogue, an agency’s ability to engage in intercircuit nonacquiescence should 
not be constrained.”86 Others have agreed that an “agency’s refusal to acquiesce 
nationwide in the decision of a nonreviewing circuit does not threaten the ability 
of the reviewing court to ensure application of the law that it deems correct.”87 
To the contrary, intercircuit nonacquiescence, like Mendoza’s prohibition on the 
invocation of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government, allows the 
Supreme Court to assess the practical consequences in the various circuits of 
different interpretations of the law,88 prevents the Government from having to 
 
the content of federal constitutional law,” “lessened judicial guidance on constitutional 
issues,” and the “failure to secure rights”); Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 420-21 (1996) (“The principal harm caused by defining a class 
narrowly is the potential of denying similarly situated persons the same opportunity for relief 
in similar claims.”). 
85 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 22, at 687 (emphasis omitted). 
86 Id. at 735-36. They further point out that “[a] bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence 
would be worse than the adoption of intercircuit stare decisis. If the ruling of one court of 
appeals effectively binds others, it makes little sense to create a system in which the binding 
rule is always the one adverse to the agency.” Id. at 741; cf. Ross E. Davies, Remedial 
Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 68 (2003) (“Reasonable minds can and do differ on 
whether traditional nonacquiescence . . . is good or bad for the rule of law generally and for 
parties subject to agency and court authority in particular.”). 
87 Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1856. 
88 See Davies, supra note 86, at 74-75 (observing that the “‘percolation’ theory . . . is the 
most widely acknowledged, though not necessarily widely popular, justification of 
nonacquiescence” (footnotes omitted)). 
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appeal every adverse ruling, and reinforces limits on lower courts’ geographic 
jurisdictions. 
Other doctrines complement Mendoza by imposing further limitations on the 
legal effects of lower court rulings. For example, district court rulings are not 
afforded any stare decisis effect. They are not binding in any jurisdiction, 
including within the district that issued them,89 and usually cannot give rise to 
“clearly established” law for purposes of § 1983 or Bivens.90 Even circuit court 
rulings leave government litigants substantial latitude to relitigate the same legal 
issues against other people. As with district court rulings, a future plaintiff may 
not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue adjudicated in a circuit 
court ruling as a matter of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. And while a 
circuit court ruling is binding as a matter of both horizontal and vertical stare 
decisis within that court’s geographic jurisdiction, it lacks binding force 
anywhere else in the country.91 
Federal statutes, in contrast, convey mixed messages about the proper role of 
the lower courts. Throughout much of the twentieth century, Congress 
prohibited individual federal judges from enjoining federal laws; only three-
judge panels were permitted to adjudicate claims for injunctive relief against 
allegedly unconstitutional federal statutes.92 This requirement was an extension 
 
89 See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
90 Academics have long debated whether judicial opinions interpreting the Constitution 
and federal laws are intrinsically binding on other branches of the Government. The Court 
famously proclaimed that the judiciary has the power “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). And the Court has unambiguously reaffirmed 
this power. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”). Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer 
have forcefully defended this concept of judicial supremacy, arguing that the judicial power 
should be construed as allowing the Supreme Court to play a “settlement function” in binding 
other governmental institutions to its interpretation of the law. Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 
(1997) (arguing that, for the Supreme Court to be able to fulfill its “settlement function,” its 
interpretation of the law must be “authoritative and supreme”). Others advocate for a type of 
departmentalism, contending that government actors are bound by judgments in cases to 
which they are parties, but are not otherwise required to follow judicial opinions. See William 
Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1812-13 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
43, 62 (1993) (“Insofar as nonjudicial actors are concerned, judicial opinions are simply 
explanations for judgments . . . .”); cf. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a 
Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126, 153-54 (1999) (arguing that opinions are not 
binding on other branches of government, but declining to take a position on whether the 
president may ignore an erroneous judgment). 
91 See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. 
92 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970) (repealed 1976) (“An interlocutory or permanent injunction 
restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to 
the Constitution of the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof 
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under 
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of an earlier provision,93 adopted as a response to Ex parte Young,94 mandating 
that three-judge panels adjudicate suits seeking injunctions against state laws.95 
In 1976, Congress eliminated the three-judge court requirement in nearly all 
cases.96 The burdens this restriction imposed on both district court judges and 
the Supreme Court—which was generally required to review such courts’ 
rulings on direct appeal, rather than as a discretionary matter through the usual 
certiorari process97—outweighed its perceived benefits.98 
On the one hand, Congress’s decision to allow single judges to enjoin federal 
laws can be seen as an expression of confidence in their competence to properly 
adjudicate such matters, without the involvement of multiple other judges. 
Conversely, the 1976 amendments can instead be interpreted as underscoring 
the importance of limiting the reach of any single district court’s constitutional 
rulings, precisely because each district judge now acts alone and the right of 
direct appellate review in the Supreme Court no longer exists.  
To determine the propriety of nationwide classes and injunctions, it is 
necessary to determine which of the Supreme Court’s competing conceptions of 
the proper role of lower courts is more accurate. Though Mendoza seems to 
 
[28 U.S.C. § 2284].”). 
93 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge 
District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 113-18 (2008) (detailing the history of the requirement 
that lawsuits seeking injunctions against state laws be heard by three-judge district courts). 
94 209 U.S. 123, 166-68 (1908) (holding that, while the Eleventh Amendment confirms 
states’ sovereign immunity from suit, plaintiffs may seek injunctions against state officials to 
prevent them from enforcing unconstitutional state laws). 
95 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (providing that an application for 
an interlocutory injunction against enforcement of a state law by a state official “shall be heard 
and determined by three judges”); see also Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238, 43 Stat. 936, 
938 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 380 (2012)) (requiring three-judge panels for a final hearing in a 
suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of a state law). 
96 See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119 (repealing 28 
U.S.C. § 2282, which required three-judge panels for constitutional challenges to federal 
laws). Three-judge courts are currently required only in a few types of cases, such as 
constitutional challenges to the “apportionment of congressional districts” or state 
legislatures, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), actions under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(1), (a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 113-14 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30110 
note (2012)), and litigation under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
§ 5(a), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a)). 
97 Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 753, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 753 (“An appeal may be taken directly 
to the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. 
98 See Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional 
Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 125-26 (2014) (“Whatever the benefits of the three-judge 
district court to litigants, particularly plaintiffs, many other influential observers eventually 
concluded that they were outweighed by the administrative burdens of the court.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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undermine Califano’s holding, the Court has neither revisited nor expressly 
questioned Califano in the decades since. Unlike Califano, Mendoza speaks 
directly to the structure of the federal judicial system, particularly the role of 
lower courts within that system. And Mendoza’s conception of the judicial 
system is buttressed by other doctrines limiting the effects of district court 
rulings. The compelling considerations that led the Mendoza Court to refrain 
from subjecting the Government to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel 
likewise counsel strongly against allowing courts to certify nationwide classes 
in cases concerning the validity or proper interpretation of federal laws, 
regulations, or policies.  
II. THE LAW GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS 
The certification of nationwide classes and issuance of nationwide injunctions 
in cases concerning the validity or proper interpretation of federal legal 
provisions also raise troubling questions under the various statutes, rules, and 
other principles governing class actions. Most basically, class certification is a 
purely procedural means of aggregating existing claims to facilitate their 
adjudication without changing the substance of class members’ rights.99 A court 
may not use a class action to “alter unilaterally class members’ preexisting 
bundle of rights.”100  
When a district court certifies a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2), 
however, it applies the law of its circuit to plaintiffs in other jurisdictions whose 
claims would otherwise be subject to adjudication under the law of their 
respective circuits, which may be materially different. Using the vehicle of a 
nationwide class action to make a particular circuit’s precedents legally 
enforceable by (or against) all right holders across the country may violate the 
Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits a court from using a procedural rule such 
as Rule 23 to modify litigants’ substantive rights.101 At the very least, allowing 
a district court to enter injunctions concerning people who live in jurisdictions 
where neither that court’s opinions, nor the opinions of the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals which that district court must apply, are the applicable law raises 
serious concerns that counsel against nationwide Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. 
Rather than simply providing a means for the enforcement of people’s rights, 
certification of nationwide Rule 23(b)(2) classes in challenges to federal laws, 
regulations, or policies invariably changes the body of law that is used to 
determine most class members’ rights, prejudicing either the government or 
those class members, depending on the case.  
 
99 Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 157 (2003) (arguing that a class action is a vehicle for adjudicating 
the rights of each class member that “preexist the class action itself”). 
100 Id. at 181. 
101 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may 
not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). 
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More fundamentally, none of the standards or procedures set forth in Rule 23 
are well suited to be used as the basis for determining whether a district court’s 
ruling should have nationwide effect. Because Califano does not impose 
substantial limits on a district court’s ability to certify a nationwide class, Rule 
23(b)(2) is the main restriction on that power. That rule, however, does not 
meaningfully limit a court’s discretion to certify classes in legal challenges 
relating to the validity or proper interpretation of a federal legal provision. 
Moreover, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) does not yield any tangible 
benefit that makes it a reasonable basis for affording nationwide effect to a 
district court’s rulings. Class definitions in Rule 23(b)(2) cases often are 
extremely broad and based on criteria that make it impracticable or impossible 
to identify members of the class. In many cases, the class may be defined simply 
in terms of anyone who is, or will be, adversely affected by the legal provision 
at issue. And putative class members are not even necessarily entitled to notice 
of a class certification motion or an opportunity to opt out.102  
In short, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is a formalistic gesture that neither 
limits the scope of a court’s discretion nor guarantees due process for putative 
class members. Our judicial system is structured to prevent a district court’s 
legal and constitutional rulings from having nationwide effect as a matter of stare 
decisis.103 Rule 23(b)(2) is far too insubstantial to constitute a reason for 
departing from that baseline and allowing a single judge to adjudicate the claims 
of all right holders throughout the nation in a single, bet-the-farm proceeding. 
A. Judicial Discretion to Certify Nationwide Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2) 
Rule 23(b)(2) allows a court to certify a class when the usual requirements for 
class certification—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation104—are satisfied, and “the party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”105 In contrast to plaintiffs pursuing class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3) to recover damages, a putative representative of a Rule 23(b)(2) class 
need not also demonstrate that a class action “is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”106 
Rule 23(b)(2) is most frequently invoked in litigation concerning civil rights 
and government benefits,107 including institutional reform cases in which the 
plaintiffs seek an order compelling improvements to a government institution 
 
102 See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra Section III.C (discussing the limited legal effects of district court opinions). 
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (enumerating the general requirements for class certification). 
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
106 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process 
in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 352 (1988). 
107 Weber, supra note 106, at 351. 
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such as a school, hospital, or prison.108 Many commentators have argued that 
Rule 23(b)(2) actions promote the interests of both governmental defendants and 
the public at large.109 They contend that a Rule 23(b)(2) class seldom allows 
plaintiffs to win broader relief than they could have obtained in a nonclass suit, 
yet it offers successful defendants the protection of res judicata against future 
claims by any class members.110 
While Rule 23 imposes substantial obstacles to class certification in many 
types of cases,111 its requirements will almost always be satisfied in challenges 
to the validity or proper interpretation of legal provisions. Virtually any 
challenged legal provision will adversely affect enough right holders to satisfy 
Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement.112 Indeed, many courts have held that 
the numerosity requirement is relaxed in Rule 23(b)(2) cases.113 Moreover, even 
if a legal provision affects only a few people at any given time, it can 
nevertheless satisfy the numerosity requirement because, as it remains on the 
books over the years, it will affect a potentially limitless number of future right 
holders.114 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements115 will likewise be 
satisfied in the overwhelming majority of constitutional challenges, including 
facial challenges, as-applied challenges that are based primarily on legal 
arguments, and as-applied challenges based on recurring factual situations that 
do not allow for substantial variation among claimants. Many of the most 
common constitutional challenges to legal provisions rest on arguments and 
considerations that are completely unrelated to the circumstances of the 
particular plaintiff asserting the claim. For example, a statute may be 
 
108 Id. at 363, 365. 
109 See, e.g., Wilton, supra note 22, at 602. 
110 Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 860 (2016) (recognizing that, 
in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, “[i]f the court decides in favor of the defendant, all class 
members are bound to that result”); Wilton, supra note 22, at 598, 600-03 (“Plaintiffs in most 
social reform cases will be able to obtain the identical declaratory or injunctive relief and 
attorneys’ fees award in both individual and class action suits. . . . On the other hand, the 
preclusive effect of the doctrine of res judicata operates as a serious threat to the class plaintiff 
if the defendant wins a class action suit.”). 
111 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359-60 (2011) (reversing class 
certification in employment discrimination lawsuit because class members lacked 
commonality). 
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (allowing class certification only if, among other things, “the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”). 
113 See, e.g., Sueoka v. United States, 101 F. App’x 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because 
plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief, the numerosity requirement is relaxed . . . .”). 
114 See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:15 (5th ed. 2011) 
(noting that a plaintiff may satisfy the numerosity requirement by encompassing future class 
members within the class definition). 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)-(3) (setting forth the commonality and typicality requirements, 
respectively, for class certification). 
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overbroad;116 be enacted for an impermissible purpose;117 fail to further a 
legitimate,118 important,119 or compelling government interest;120 burden more 
speech or conduct than is permissible to achieve the government’s interest;121 
impose impermissible content- or viewpoint-based discrimination;122 exceed the 
scope of the government’s authority under the constitutional provision that 
purportedly authorizes the law;123 or be supported by an insufficient evidentiary 
record.124 
Similarly, a regulation may be invalid on any of these grounds, or because it 
exceeds the scope of an agency’s organic statute125 or violates some other 
statutory restriction.126 All of these claims turn on an alleged conflict between 
the text of a legal provision and a superior source of law (i.e., the Constitution 
or a statute), defects in a provision’s legislative history or administrative record, 
or legislative facts that have nothing to do with the individualized circumstances 
of particular plaintiffs or right holders. The claims of putative class members 
 
116 Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987) (concluding 
that a resolution limiting free speech was substantially overbroad). 
117 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits states from enacting laws with a racially discriminatory purpose). 
118 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny). 
119 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny). 
120 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 748, 753 (2011) 
(applying strict scrutiny). 
121 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014) (holding that aggregate contribution 
limits were unconstitutional due to “a substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated 
objective and the means selected to achieve it”). 
122 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 256 (1974) (invalidating a 
statute requiring a newspaper that criticizes a candidate or publishes attacks on the candidate’s 
record to provide him or her with equal space to respond). 
123 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (holding that 
Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to purchase 
health insurance); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that a federal 
law prohibiting gun possession in school zones exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause). 
124 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 536 (1997) (declaring the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in part because its “legislative record lacks 
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious 
bigotry”). 
125 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486, 471 (2001) (holding that the EPA 
exceeded its powers under its organic statute by considering costs when promulgating air 
quality standards). 
126 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786 (2014) (holding 
that an agency regulation requiring employers to offer employees health insurance that covers 
forms of contraception that violate those employers’ religious beliefs was invalid under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
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will invariably involve common questions of law, and the class representative’s 
claim will be typical of them. 
These considerations also will generally be sufficient to ensure the adequacy 
of the class representative.127 A class representative need not be knowledgeable 
about the case or the underlying legal issues.128 Nor does the fact that members 
of the putative class may disagree with the underlying lawsuit or not wish to 
assert their rights render a representative inadequate.129 In short, Rule 23 
imposes minimal restrictions on certification of classes for injunctive or 
declaratory relief that will almost invariably be satisfied as a matter of law in 
most kinds of constitutional cases and other litigation challenging the validity or 
proper interpretation of statutes or regulations. 
Precisely because the requirements for certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2) 
are so easily satisfied in such challenges, the rule cannot resolve the tension 
between Mendoza and Califano. Moreover, the requirements set forth in Rule 
23(a) and (b)(2) appear almost completely inapposite to determining whether a 
single district judge’s constitutional interpretations should be binding on all right 
holders nationwide. None of those standards relate to either the structural 
considerations identified in Mendoza or the efficiency and fairness concerns 
articulated in Califano. In short, Rule 23(b)(2) provides little guidance in 
determining the appropriate breadth of a plaintiff class in a challenge to a federal 
legal provision or confirming the propriety of a nationwide injunction.  
B. The Procedures for Nationwide Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) 
The procedures for certifying a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2) also fail 
to perform any meaningful functions that justify empowering a district court to 
enter a nationwide injunction. First, Rule 23 does not require that members of a 
putative Rule 23(b)(2) class receive notice or an opportunity to opt out prior to 
class certification.130 Class members are entitled to receive notice only if a case 
 
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that “the representative parties . . . fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class”). 
128 See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1966) (allowing a class 
action to proceed where the class representative “did not understand the complaint at all,” 
“could not explain the statements made in the complaint,” and “had a very small degree of 
knowledge as to what the lawsuit was about”). 
129 See, e.g., Probe v. State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(allowing a class action challenge to the state teachers’ retirement system to proceed 
“notwithstanding the fact that there may be some [teachers] who would prefer that it remain 
in operation”). 
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (specifying that notice is optional for members of putative 
Rule 23(b)(2) classes); see also Weber, supra note 106, at 348 (arguing that Rule 23(b)(2) is 
“unfair” because the rule subjects all class members to res judicata while “dispens[ing] with 
mandatory notice, so that the class members who are bound by the judgment may never learn 
of the pendency of the case”); Maximilian A. Grant, Comment, The Right Not to Sue: A First 
Amendment Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory Class Actions, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 
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is settled without a formal adjudication;131 even then, they are not permitted to 
opt out,132 but rather may only file an objection for the court’s consideration.133 
Moreover, despite the fact that class members may have no opportunity to opt 
out of a lawsuit, they are generally bound to its results as a matter of res judicata, 
because they are deemed parties to the suit.134 Many commentators, objecting to 
this policy, have argued that a class member should not be bound by the outcome 
of a lawsuit unless he or she was afforded an opportunity to decide whether or 
not to participate in the litigation.135 Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
putative class members, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is immaterial; it may occur 
without their knowledge and they have no ability to object. 
Second, Rule 23(b)(2) does not play an important role in defining or limiting 
the class of people to whom a court’s ruling applies. In addition to satisfying 
Rule 23(a)’s requirements, a putative class generally must be defined in 
reasonably definite terms, based on objective criteria, to make the identities of 
its members ascertainable.136 The definiteness and ascertainability requirements 
either do not apply in Rule 23(b)(2) cases,137 or apply in a far less demanding 
and precise manner.138 Class definitions in constitutional and similar public law 
 
256 (1996) (arguing that mandatory class actions that preclude members from opting out 
violate putative class members’ First Amendment right to avoid engaging in expressive 
association concerning litigation they may oppose). 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)-(2) (specifying when class members are entitled to notice). 
132 See Weber, supra note 106, at 389; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (specifying that members 
of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, unlike members of Rule 23(b)(2) class, may opt out of the class if 
they disagree with the proposed settlement). 
133 FED. R. CIV, P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires 
court approval under this subdivision . . . .”). 
134 Weber, supra note 107, at 374 (emphasizing the problem that members of Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes may be subject to res judicata despite never learning of the earlier suit). 
135 E.g., id. at 400-03 (arguing in favor of a variation of spurious class actions in which a 
class is not certified until after the government defendant is held liable, the government pays 
for the cost of notice, and individuals have the chance to decide whether to opt into the 
plaintiff class to receive the benefit of the ruling); Grant, supra note 130, at 256 (arguing that 
requiring a person to be a member of a Rule 23(b)(2) class violates their First Amendment 
rights). 
136 FED. JUDICIAL CT., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.222, at 270 (4th ed. 2004) 
(outlining the standards for determining whether the identities of class members are 
ascertainable). 
137 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A]scertainability is 
not a requirement for certification of a (b)(2) class seeking only injunctive and declaratory 
relief . . . .”); Shook v. El Paso Cty., 386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2004) (suggesting the 
identifiability requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) do not apply to 23(b)(2) classes); see also 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 114, § 3:7 (explaining that definiteness is not required for class 
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).  
138 See, e.g., In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that some courts have found that a precise class definition is unnecessary for classes certified 
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cases typically are vague and subjective, or otherwise difficult to apply,139 and 
may depend upon the mental state of potential members or their present or future 
intentions. A class may include anyone adversely affected by a particular statute 
or who wishes to exercise a particular right140—including future right holders.141 
It may be difficult or impossible to ascertain the identities of class members 
based on many of these definitions. 
Thus, class certification in Rule 23(b)(2) cases has virtually no practical 
effect. The class is usually defined so broadly that it can encompass anyone who 
would be able to assert nonmutual collateral estoppel, if that doctrine were 
available. Frequently, neither the court nor the government can identify the 
members of the class, particularly when it involves future right holders. And the 
class members themselves—to the extent their identities are ascertainable—
receive neither notice nor an opportunity to opt out of class certification.  
As Part III explains, federal district courts generally lack power to impose 
their view of the law on parties outside the bounds of their respective 
jurisdictions. Neither the standards for certification of Rule 23(b)(2) classes nor 
the procedure for certification of such classes provides a satisfactory basis for 
allowing a district court to depart from that baseline. Moreover, by certifying 
nationwide classes and issuing nationwide injunctions, a district court raises 
serious questions under both the Rules Enabling Act and the general principles 
underlying class action litigation by using the procedural mechanism of Rule 
23(b)(2) to change the substantive law—the body of binding circuit court 
precedents—that otherwise governs the claims of right holders living in other 
circuits. Thus, the laws, rules, and principles governing class actions further 
counsel against nationwide class certification and nationwide injunctions.  
III. INCONSISTENCY AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF LOWER COURT RULINGS 
As previous Parts have suggested, allowing federal district courts to grant 
nationwide injunctions creates inconsistencies concerning the scope of their 
powers. When a court interprets a legal provision or determines that it is 
unconstitutional, its ruling may involve up to three different components: a 
 
under rule 23(b)(2)). 
139 See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 264-65 (D.N.H. 2013) (certifying a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class of “[a]ll persons with serious mental illness who . . . are at serious risk of 
unnecessarily institutionalization” in certain facilities). 
140 See, e.g., Finch v. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., 252 F.R.D. 192, 196, 
203 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class of “all persons who are working or 
desire to work” for a state social services agency and who “now and in the future” are listed 
on the state’s child abuse registry and have requested that the report be amended). 
141 See, e.g., Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:9-CV-621, 2010 WL 2017773, at *8 (D. 
Conn. May 20, 2010) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class of “[a]ll present, prospective, and future 
female students at Quinnipiac University who are harmed by and want to end Quinnipiac 
University’s sex discrimination”). 
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judgment, an injunction, and a written opinion.142 A written opinion setting forth 
a district court’s reasoning and conclusions lacks legal force in other districts; a 
circuit court opinion likewise is not binding in other circuits. When a district 
court certifies a nationwide class, however, it assumes the power to issue binding 
judgments and injunctions concerning people outside the scope of its geographic 
jurisdiction. The same considerations that warrant the imposition of geographic 
limits on the legal effects of lower court opinions generally apply with equal 
force to other components of their rulings—judgments and injunctions—and 
bolster the case against nationwide injunctions.  
A. Judgments and Res Judicata 
A judgment is the only essential element of a court’s ruling. A judgment is an 
independent document that specifies the court’s disposition of the plaintiff’s 
causes of action.143 It may not contain the court’s reasoning or any “record of 
prior proceedings” in the case.144  
The primary effect of a judgment in cases challenging the validity or proper 
interpretation of a federal statute, regulation, or policy is res judicata.145 The 
question of the challenged provision’s validity or meaning is dispositively 
resolved between the plaintiffs in the case and the defendant agencies or 
officials. Res judicata bars government defendants from enforcing an 
invalidated legal provision against the plaintiffs who challenged it.146 
Conversely, a judgment upholding a statute’s constitutionality—in other words, 
a judgment in favor of government defendants on a plaintiff’s constitutional 
claim—precludes future challenges by that plaintiff.147 The res judicata effect of 
 
142 See Morley, supra note 42, at 2461-66 (describing the different legal effects and 
impacts of each of these three components); Morley, supra note 25, at 535-38 (explaining the 
interplay among judgments, opinions, and injunctions). 
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a) (“Every judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a 
separate document . . . .”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (authorizing federal courts to 
grant declaratory judgments to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested 
party”). 
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a). 
145 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17(3) (1980) (stating that a judgment is 
conclusive in any subsequent action between the same parties with respect to any issues that 
were actually litigated and essential to the judgments). A judgment for monetary damages 
(including damages for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) or Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) also 
empowers the plaintiff to levy against the defendant’s assets to recover the specified amount 
of money. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 829-33 (4th ed. 2010)). 
146 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1979) (“Because we find 
that the constitutional question presented by this appeal was determined adversely to the 
United States in a prior state proceeding, we reverse on grounds of collateral estoppel without 
reaching the merits.”). 
147 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding that a criminal defendant 
convicted in state court was collaterally estopped from relitigating issues in federal habeas 
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a judgment is not subject to geographic limits. A litigant may invoke the res 
judicata effect of a federal court’s judgment in any court as a matter of federal 
common law,148 and of a state court’s judgment as a matter of full faith and 
credit.149 
A judgment’s res judicata effect typically applies only to the parties involved 
in that case.150 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses 
generally protect third parties from being subject to the res judicata effects of a 
judgment in a case unless they received notice of it, were granted an opportunity 
to be heard,151 and were made parties to it.152 Third parties who stand in certain 
legal relationships with earlier litigants—such as bailor-bailee, assignor-
assignee, trustee-beneficiary, or principal-agent—may be bound, however, by 
the result of litigation in which they were not personally involved.153 Similarly, 
class members may be bound by the results of a class action lawsuit unless they 
opted out.154 
 
proceedings that had been decided against him in the underlying criminal case); cf. Migra v. 
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83-85 (1984) (holding that res judicata 
barred plaintiffs from pursuing a federal lawsuit under § 1983 against defendants they had 
previously sued unsuccessfully in state court on state-law grounds). But see Whole Women’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305-07 (2016) (declining to hold that plaintiffs’ as-
applied challenge to abortion restrictions was precluded by their previous unsuccessful facial 
challenge because they had developed additional facts which established the restrictions’ 
unconstitutionality). 
148 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08 (2001) (“[F]ederal 
common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in 
diversity.”). Federal common law would obviously also govern federal question cases. 
149 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to afford full faith and credit to the judicial 
proceedings of other states); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (requiring all courts to afford a state 
court judgment the same res judicata effect as the courts of that state would afford it); Allen, 
449 U.S. at 94-96 (recognizing that full faith and credit includes both issue and claim 
preclusion). 
150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(2)-(3) (explaining that “a person who 
is not a party to an action” is generally not bound by res judicata). 
151 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) (recognizing “notice and opportunity to 
be heard” as fundamental requirements of due process). 
152 Id. at 40 (“[O]ne is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is 
not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” 
(citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877))); Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 
U.S. 431, 441 (1934) (“The law does not impose . . . the burden of voluntary intervention in 
a suit to which [a person] is a stranger. . . . Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal 
proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not 
affect his legal rights.”). 
153 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“[N]onparty preclusion may be justified 
based on a variety of pre-existing ‘substantive legal relationship[s]’ between the person to be 
bound and a party to the judgment.” (quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 77-78 (2001))). 
154 Id.; Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41 (“[T]he judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to 
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These principles generally apply with equal force to government litigants.155 
The very structure of the Constitution suggests that government officials are 
bound to follow judgments issued against them by courts of competent 
jurisdiction.156 If legislative and executive officials were free to determine the 
validity of a judicial ruling for themselves, or whether to follow it, court rulings 
in public law cases would be mere advisory opinions,157 which courts have 
refused to issue dating back to the Founding Era.158 
In itself, however, a judgment does not bind the government with respect to 
people or entities other than the particular plaintiffs in that case. A judgment in 
favor of certain plaintiffs does not collaterally estop the government from 
enforcing the same legal provision against different people, or from relitigating 
the provision’s constitutionality or proper interpretation in subsequent 
proceedings against third parties.159 In other words, as Part I explores in greater 
detail, neither the federal government nor state governments are subject to 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel.160 Conversely, if a court rejects a 
particular plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to a statute, that judgment would 
 
which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class . . . .”). 
155 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1979) (holding that the United States 
was collaterally estopped from challenging a prior judgment because it exercised sufficient 
control over the prior litigation); see also United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 
173 (1984) (holding that collateral estoppel applies “where the Government is litigating the 
same issue arising under virtually identical facts against the same party”). One notable 
distinction between private parties and government litigants with regard to res judicata is that 
private litigants are subject to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, Parklane Hosiery Co. 
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979), while government litigants are not, United States v. 
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). See supra Section I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
rationale for refusing to apply nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the 
Government). 
156 See Baude, supra note 90, at 1845 (“[T]here are good historical, textual, and structural 
reasons to treat judicial dispositions of individual cases as legally binding.”). 
157 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.2 (1792) (“[B]y the Constitution, 
neither the Secretary at War, nor any other Executive officer, nor even the Legislature, are 
authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.”). 
158 Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to President George Washington (Aug. 
8, 1793), in STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 
179, 179-80 (1997) (refusing then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson’s request for an 
advisory opinion). 
159 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984); see also United States v. Alaska, 
521 U.S. 1, 13 (1997) (citing Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160-63) (“[T]he doctrine of nonmutual 
collateral estoppel is generally unavailable in litigation against the United States . . . .”); 
Stauffer Chem., 464 U.S. at 173 (noting the Court’s rejection of “the application of collateral 
estoppel against the Government in the absence of mutuality”). 
160 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162-63 (“[N]onmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does 
not apply against the Government . . . .”). 
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not, in itself, preclude subsequent litigants from challenging the provision’s 
validity or interpretation, either on the same grounds or different ones.161 
Because judgments are binding only upon the parties to a case, class 
certification can have a tremendous impact on the scope of a judgment’s legal 
effects. In a class action suit, a favorable judgment runs in favor of each member 
of the plaintiff class, which collectively may include all people across the state 
or nation affected by the challenged legal provision.162 Conversely, if a court 
rejects a constitutional claim in a class action case, the ruling precludes class 
members from pursuing similar challenges, even in more favorable 
jurisdictions.163 Thus, allowing district courts to certify nationwide classes 
enables them to adjudicate claims and enter judgments for or against class 
members who live well outside their geographic jurisdictions.  
B. Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions and Contempt 
When a court holds a legal provision unconstitutional, it also may enjoin the 
government defendant from enforcing it. An injunction is the strongest means 
available for enforcing judicially determined rights.164 Injunctions differ from 
judgments in several respects. First, an injunction expressly orders a party to 
engage in, or refrain from, particular actions, whereas a judgment only 
announces a court’s conclusions concerning certain litigants’ legal claims that 
bind those parties in future litigation. Second, injunctions are enforceable 
through civil165 or criminal166 contempt, while judgments require a court to take 
some further action, such as issuing an injunction, before they may be enforced. 
Third, an injunction may not only forbid the defendant agencies or officials 
from violating a plaintiff’s legal or constitutional rights, but further require them 
to perform, or refrain from performing, certain acts as prophylactic measures to 
protect those underlying rights.167 Judgments, in contrast, are limited to 
 
161 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877)); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008). 
162 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701-03 (1979) (authorizing certification of 
nationwide class actions). 
163 Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (“A judgment in 
favor of either side is conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue actually 
litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment.”). 
164 Morley, supra note 42, at 2457. 
165 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994) (“[C]ivil 
contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court 
order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience.”). 
166 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987) (“[T]he 
initiation of [criminal] contempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is a part 
of the judicial function.”). 
167 See Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and 
Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314 (2004) (“The 
conduct addressed in a prophylactic injunction, unlike other equitable relief, directs legal 
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identifying the prevailing parties for each cause of action and declaring litigants’ 
rights. For these reasons, an injunction is usually regarded as a stronger or 
harsher remedy than a judgment alone.168 
Samuel Bray rejects the notion that injunctions are harsher or stronger 
remedies than declaratory judgments, arguing that “these remedies are rough 
substitutes, and in many cases they have the same effect.”169 He does not 
explain, however, what it means to say that a particular remedy is milder, 
weaker, or stronger than another.170  
Among the most important considerations in determining the “harshness” of 
a remedy are the explicitness of any threat and the imminence of coercion. An 
injunction is an express command; the imperative force of a judgment, in 
contrast, is implicit in the court’s adjudication of the parties’ rights.171 More 
importantly, injunctions carry the possibility of immediate civil and criminal 
sanctions for violations that declaratory judgments lack.172 The distinction 
between a declaratory judgment and an injunction is akin to the difference 
between a police officer with her weapons holstered politely asking someone for 
a moment of their time, and an officer pointing pepper spray or a Taser at 
someone, threatening to shoot unless they freeze. In both scenarios, the 
possibility of coercion is unavoidably present, but it is much more explicit and 
imminent in the latter. Likewise, the injunction’s imperative nature and 
immediate enforceability render it a more effective and “harsher” remedy than 
a declaratory judgment alone. 
Bray contends that the absence of immediate sanctions for parties that act 
contrary to declaratory judgments is practically irrelevant.173 He points out that 
parties typically will conform their conduct to judicial declarations174 to avoid 
 
conduct that is affiliated with, rather than the direct cause of or result of, the harm.”). 
168 E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974) (indicating that a declaratory 
judgment is “a milder alternative” to an injunction (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 
111-15 (1971))); OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 107 n.39 (1978) (describing a 
declaratory judgment as an “injunction without sanctions”); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 14-15 (1983) (contending that 
injunctive remedies are more intrusive than declaratory judgments and damage awards). 
169 Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1095 
(2014). 
170 See id. 
171 Perez, 401 U.S. at 124 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A broad 
injunction against all enforcement of a statute paralyzes the State’s enforcement machinery: 
the statute is rendered a nullity. A declaratory judgment, on the other hand, is merely a 
declaration of legal status and rights; it neither mandates nor prohibits state action.”). 
172 Bray argues that the immediate availability of contempt makes injunctions more 
“managerial” than declaratory judgments, rather than harsher. Bray, supra note 169, at 1127. 
173 Bray contends that, rather than focusing on the intrinsic “doctrinal” characteristics of 
injunctions, we should instead focus on the declaratory judgment’s role in a “legal and social 
environment.” Id. at 1121. 
174 Id. at 1108-09 (arguing that “there is no need for a command” because, “[a]fter [a] 
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the sanctions for violating the underlying legal right or prohibition that the 
declaratory judgment is enforcing.175 While Bray makes solid arguments, they 
establish only that, in cases where parties truly sought clarification of their rights 
to guide their future conduct, a declaratory judgment is usually sufficient to 
resolve the dispute. The fact that injunctions may often be unnecessary, 
however, does not imply that they are equivalent to, or no harsher than, 
declaratory judgments. 
Furthermore, there are many circumstances in which litigants may not be 
deterred by the likely outcome of subsequent litigation in the manner Bray 
contemplates.176 Some litigants may not engage in the same rational assessment 
of future litigation outcomes that Bray contemplates without the possibility of 
immediate sanctions that injunctions afford.177 Political actors in particular 
sometimes face strong incentives to challenge courts and push back on 
constitutional determinations until absolutely compelled to comply.178 
Moreover, in situations where exhaustion requirements or practical 
considerations preclude a person from quickly “upgrading” a declaratory 
judgment to a restraining order or injunction,179 a declaratory judgment often 
will be less of a deterrent to illegal conduct than an injunction. Thus, while Bray 
makes valid points, he does not establish that declaratory judgments and 
injunctions are effectively equivalent. 
Like a judgment, an injunction applies primarily to the parties in the case. It 
binds not only the named defendants in the case and their agents, but also “other 
persons who are in active concert or participation” with them.180 Conversely, an 
injunction typically is enforceable only by the parties protected by it. In a class 
action case, depending on the breadth of the plaintiff class, an injunction may 
run in favor of all right holders within the judicial district, state, circuit, or even 
 
declaratory judgment, everyone knows what to do”). 
175 Id. at 1110-11 (“[T]here is no need to threaten the losing plaintiff with a contempt 
sanction: the very sanction that motivated a person to seek a declaratory judgment is a 
sufficient deterrent.”). 
176 See id. at 1111 (offering a model of litigants’ incentives); cf. Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 
950, 974 (1979) (“[A] divorcing spouse will generally have no expectation that an adjudicated 
case will create precedent, or that any precedent created will be of personal benefit in future 
litigation.”). 
177 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective 
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 204-06 (2005) (explaining how emotions may cause litigants 
to make “inaccurate predictions” concerning potential litigation); cf. Marc Galanter, The Civil 
Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 252-53 (discussing 
various reasons why parties do not accurately anticipate litigation outcomes). 
178 Morley, supra note 42, at 2481-83. 
179 Cf. Bray, supra note 169, at 1110 (“[A] plaintiff who receives a declaratory judgment 
can go back to court and receive an injunction if needed . . . .”). 
180 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
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nation.181 Thus, a single district judge may issue an order prohibiting the 
government from enforcing a legal provision anywhere in the country, 
regardless of the limits of the court’s geographic jurisdiction. 
Circuits have split over the proper scope of injunctive relief in cases other 
than class actions (“nonclass cases”).182 After invalidating a legal provision, 
some courts will issue a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction that bars the government 
from enforcing that provision against only the particular plaintiffs in the case.183 
In a class action brought on behalf of all right holders, a Plaintiff-Oriented 
Injunction will afford relief to everyone adversely affected by the challenged 
provision. Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions in nonclass cases, in contrast, leave the 
government defendants free to continue enforcing the invalidated provisions 
against other right holders and defend the provisions’ validity in subsequent 
litigation.184 
A Defendant-Oriented Injunction, in contrast, completely prohibits the 
defendant officials and agencies from enforcing the invalidated legal provision 
against anyone.185 Defendant-Oriented Injunctions treat nonclass cases as de 
 
181 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702-03 (1979) (“The certification of a nationwide 
class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is committed in the first instance to the discretion 
of the district court.”). 
182 For a thorough discussion of the distinction between Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions, see Morley, supra note 14, at 491-93. 
183 Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 489 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(enjoining the state from applying its contribution limits to certain types of contributions only 
from the plaintiff political committee); Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 
393 (4th Cir. 2001) (prohibiting the FEC from applying its regulatory definition of “express 
advocacy” only to the plaintiff organization). 
184 Future litigation over the constitutionality of a provision that a district or even circuit 
court holds unconstitutional is possible because, as discussed in Section III.A, a court’s 
judgment binds only the parties to the case, and neither the federal government nor the states 
are subject to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 
154, 162-63 (1984). Moreover, district court opinions generally lack precedential value and 
cannot make the law “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes. See infra notes 
223-26 and accompanying text. In cases involving “indivisible” rights, such as the right to a 
desegregated school system or legislative districts of equal population size, it is impossible to 
grant relief just to a single plaintiff without effectively granting relief to all other affected 
right holders. See ALI AGGREGATE LIMITATION, supra note 31, § 2.04(a)-(b) (defining 
indivisible remedies as those for which granting “relief to any claimant as a practical matter 
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants”). Thus, to 
comply with a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction concerning indivisible rights, government 
defendants would also have to enforce the rights of third-party nonlitigants (at least so long 
as the plaintiff retains standing to continue enforcing the injunction). Many constitutional and 
statutory rights are “divisible,” however, meaning that the government can enforce or uphold 
them solely with regard to particular people. Id. (defining divisible remedies as those which 
may be limited “to one or more claimants individually”). 
185 Morley, supra note 25, at 490-91, 504-10; see, e.g., Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 
518, 533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (issuing a Defendant-Oriented Injunction because granting relief 
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facto class actions, granting relief to all right holders rather than just the 
immediate plaintiffs in the case.186 Such injunctions raise a variety of troubling 
constitutional, jurisdictional, and policy concerns,187 and I have argued 
elsewhere that courts should generally avoid issuing them.188 Particularly in 
jurisdictions that require courts to issue Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions, certifying 
a nationwide class allows a court to issue an injunction enforcing the rights of 
class members throughout the nation, well beyond the bounds of its geographic 
jurisdiction.  
C. Opinions, Stare Decisis, and Civil Liability 
The final possible component of a judicial ruling invalidating a legal 
provision is the court’s opinion. The primary effect of a legal opinion is stare 
decisis,189 which includes both horizontal and vertical components. Horizontal 
stare decisis refers to the obligation of the same court to either apply the same 
ruling, or give great deference to it, in future cases.190 Vertical stare decisis is 
the obligation of lower courts to follow the ruling.191 
Stare decisis requires the Court to “sometimes fail[] to enforce what otherwise 
would be the best interpretation of particular constitutional [and statutory] 
provisions.”192 The doctrine applies with greater force to previous judicial 
interpretations of statutes than the Constitution, because it is easier for Congress 
to correct perceived errors in statutory precedents (by amending the statute) than 
constitutional ones.193 As “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command” in 
 
just to the individual plaintiff would be “unconscionable”). 
186 Morley, supra note 25, at 500-01. 
187 See id. at 521-38 (discussing the problems with Defendant-Oriented Injunctions). 
188 Id. at 550-53. 
189 Stare decisis also likely attaches to the actual judgment. Because courts virtually always 
issue written opinions amplifying and explaining judgments in cases that are likely to have 
important precedential effects, later courts and advocates usually rely on the opinion in an 
earlier case rather than the underlying judgment when invoking stare decisis. For discussions 
of the historical development of stare decisis, see generally Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as 
a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001), and Thomas R. Lee, Stare 
Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 647 (1999). 
190 Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
191 See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1711, 1712 (2013). 
192 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577-78 (2001). 
193 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (declaring that stare decisis “is at 
its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only 
by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stating that, “particularly . . . in constitutional cases,” stare decisis “is 
not an inexorable command”); cf. Lee, supra note 189, at 652 (“The modern dichotomy that 
allocates deference based on the statutory or constitutional basis of the precedent finds no 
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either type of case,194 the Court will overturn a precedent when its adverse 
consequences outweigh the general systemic and reliance considerations 
underlying stare decisis.195 This flexibility leads many critics to contend that 
Justices’ personal political preferences, rather than any objective or consistent 
doctrine of stare decisis, are the true determinants of the continuing validity of 
Supreme Court precedents.196 
An opinion’s precise vertical and horizontal stare decisis effects depend 
primarily on the level of court that issues it.197 A Supreme Court opinion binds 
all federal and state courts throughout the nation as a matter of vertical stare 
decisis.198 The Court also affords its own precedents substantial weight as a 
matter of horizontal stare decisis.199 
 
support in the founding era and very little support in Supreme Court decisions of the 
nineteenth century.”); Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)Accuracy of the 
Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for Supreme 
Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 969, 973 (2008) (identifying Justice Brandeis’s dissent in 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
as the origin of the two-tiered standard of stare decisis). 
194 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. 
195 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009) (identifying factors courts must 
consider when deciding whether to overturn precedents); cf. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as 
Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 414-15 (2010) (arguing that the force of stare 
decisis should depend exclusively on the extent to which a precedent has been relied upon). 
Kurt Lash argues that, because the American government rests on popular sovereignty, the 
Court should be more willing to overturn precedents that remove issues from the sphere of 
“democratic decision making” (i.e., those holding laws unconstitutional), than precedents that 
leave room for contemporary democratic majorities to reach their own conclusions on issues. 
Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative Theory, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2208-09 (2014); see also Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2011) (arguing that the validity of stare decisis 
depends on the nature of the issue and whether the Court previously upheld or invalidated the 
challenged legal provision). 
196 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 195, at 414 (“[T]he modern doctrine of stare decisis is 
essentially indeterminate. The various factors that drive the doctrine are largely devoid of 
independent meaning or predictive force. . . . [T]his weakness exposes the Court to criticism 
for appearing results-oriented in its application of stare decisis.”). 
197 One controversial issue is whether dicta gives rise to either a horizontal or vertical stare 
decisis effect. Some courts hold that they are bound to follow both the holdings and dicta of 
opinions from higher courts. E.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“[C]arefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, 
generally must be treated as authoritative.” (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 724 
(D.C. Cir. 2003))). Other courts believe that such dicta should be afforded “considerable 
weight,” but does not have the same binding effect as the Court’s outright holdings. United 
States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975). 
198 MOORE ET AL., supra note 72, § 134.02[2]. 
199 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (“Our precedent is to be respected 
unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course 
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A United States Court of Appeals opinion—whether from the court sitting en 
banc or from a three-judge panel—binds future three-judge panels of that court 
as a matter of horizontal stare decisis,200 as well as all federal district courts 
within that circuit as a matter of vertical stare decisis.201 Only a circuit court 
sitting en banc (or the United States Supreme Court) may overrule a prior en 
banc or panel ruling.202 Unlike the Supreme Court, a three-judge panel of the 
circuit court lacks authority to reconsider and overrule earlier decisions of the 
court.203 
District court rulings cannot have any vertical stare decisis effect because 
there are no lower courts within the federal judicial hierarchy upon which their 
rulings could be binding. Their rulings are not afforded precedential effect as a 
matter of horizontal stare decisis, including within the same district.204 
These stare decisis requirements arise from a variety of sources. The vertical 
stare decisis impact of Supreme Court opinions is likely constitutionally 
mandated. The Constitution requires that the federal judiciary be comprised of 
 
that is sure error.”). 
200 Under Seal v. Under Seal, 326 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 2003) (“As a panel of the full 
court, we cannot overrule prior decisions of the court, panel or en banc, and we are bound to 
apply principles decided by prior decisions of the court to the questions we address.”). 
201 Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“[A] district court is bound by decisions made by its circuit court.”). 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 500 F. App’x 802, 803 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under 
the prior panel rule, ‘a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and 
until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by [an 
appeals court] sitting en banc.’” (quoting United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th 
Cir. 2008))). 
203 Id. 
204 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court 
judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, 
or even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quoting 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011))); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (“[F]ederal district judges, sitting as sole adjudicators, 
lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the 
same court.”); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996) (noting 
that each district court judge “sits alone and renders decisions not binding on the others”). 
Decades ago, some district court rulings stated that judges generally should follow precedents 
from their own district as a matter of comity unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., E.W. 
Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 174 F. Supp. 99, 121 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (indicating that 
the district’s judges should adhere to that district’s precedents), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
285 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 2 F.R.D. 224, 234 
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (stating that, when a district court judge “has put out a considered opinion 
on a question of law, it is felt generally by his associates that good administration requires 
them to accept it unless some other judge of this court . . . thinks that the ruling . . . was clearly 
erroneous”). For a thorough analysis of district court opinions’ lack of precedential value, see 
Mead, supra note 22, at 800-04 (discussing changing attitudes toward stare decisis for district 
court opinions). 
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“one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.”205 This constitutionally prescribed judicial 
hierarchy strongly implies that “inferior” courts are obligated to follow Supreme 
Court rulings,206 and the Supreme Court can enforce this requirement by 
reversing lower court rulings that deviate from, misconstrue, or ignore its 
precedents. Because the Constitution does not expressly discuss intermediate 
appellate courts, vertical stare decisis likely arises for U.S. Courts of Appeals’ 
rulings as a matter of statute, from Congress’s implicit decisions about the 
structure and relationship of those courts to federal district courts.207 
Horizontal stare decisis is more controversial. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly referred to the stare decisis effect it affords its own opinions as a 
matter of “policy.”208 Some commentators argue that horizontal stare decisis is 
a matter of federal common law and may be changed or abrogated by 
Congress.209 Richard Fallon rejects this argument, contending instead that 
Article III’s grant of the “judicial power” allows the Supreme Court to craft rules 
concerning the binding force of its own precedent.210 As Fallon cogently notes, 
if stare decisis were not constitutionally authorized or mandated, it “could not 
displace what otherwise would be the best interpretation of the written 
Constitution binding on the Supreme Court as ‘the supreme Law of the 
Land.’”211 He contends that Congress may not abrogate the stare decisis effect 
 
205 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
206 Winslow v. FERC, 587 F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Vertical stare decisis—both 
in letter and in spirit—is a critical aspect of our hierarchical Judiciary headed by ‘one supreme 
Court.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1))). 
207 See Baude, supra note 90, at 1845 (discussing statutory reasons why circuit court 
rulings are binding on district courts). But see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 838-39 (1994) (arguing that the 
vertical stare decisis of circuit court opinions arises from federal common law rather than 
statute). 
208 E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (emphasizing that stare decisis 
reflects a “policy judgment” and is not an “inexorable command”); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 
U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social 
policy.”). 
209 See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 
503, 504-05, 512 (2000) (“Rules of precedent are like rules of evidence for questions of law 
rather than fact.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May 
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1550-51 
(2000) (concluding that Congress may alter the rules of stare decisis because “[n]othing in the 
text, history or structure of the Constitution, in judicial precedent interpreting it, or in 
customary practice supports the conclusion that the Constitution itself prescribes a judicial 
policy of stare decisis having any determinate or readily identifiable content”). 
210 See Fallon, supra note 192, at 577-78, 591-92 (“Article III’s grant of ‘the judicial 
Power’ authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a principle of stare decisis and, 
more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element of constitutional adjudication.”). 
211 Id. at 591 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the 
  
2017] NATIONWIDE INJUCTIONS 651 
 
of judicial rulings because part of the judicial function is deciding which sources 
of authority to rely upon and the weight each should be accorded.212 
In Anastasoff v. United States,213 a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit took this argument even further, concluding that stare 
decisis is constitutionally mandated.214 The court held that every judicial 
“declaration and interpretation” of the law that is necessary to resolve a case is 
“authoritative” and “must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated 
parties.”215 The panel concluded that the Eighth Circuit’s local rule declaring 
unpublished opinions to be nonprecedential and discouraging citation of them 
was unconstitutional.216 
Other courts have rejected this attempt to constitutionalize stare decisis. The 
Ninth Circuit held that Article III’s grant of the “judicial Power” was just that—
a grant of authority—and could not be interpreted as limiting the manner in 
which a court may use it.217 The court further explained that the Eighth Circuit’s 
interpretation was inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
Constitution, because modern notions of stare decisis and precedent did not 
develop until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.218 It added that, even if the 
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation were correct as an originalist matter, federal 
courts were free to revise their operating methods, including by issuing 
unpublished opinions that lack precedential value.219 The court concluded, 
 
Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme 
Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008) (arguing that 
stare decisis is neither constitutionally grounded nor required). 
212 Fallon, supra note 192, at 592; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: 
Listening to Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1314 (2008) (“[A]dopting 
some form of stare decisis is part of the process of deciding cases, committed to judicial 
authority as part of the Article III judicial power to the same extent as the choice between 
different tiers of scrutiny.”). But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against 
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 28 (1994) (arguing that stare decisis is 
unconstitutional because the obligation of Supreme Court Justices to uphold and enforce the 
Constitution requires them to apply that document rather than contrary precedents). 
213 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted and vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
214 Id. at 899-900 (holding that stare decisis “derive[s] from the nature of judicial power”); 
see also Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam) (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding that the question of whether unpublished opinions 
must be treated as precedential is “close”); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After 
the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 82-84 (2000) (arguing that Anastasoff promotes 
“transparency of judicial decisionmaking” and ensures that like cases are treated alike). 
215 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899-900. 
216 Id. at 899 (citing 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i)). 
217 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he term ‘judicial Power’ 
in Article III is more likely descriptive than prescriptive.”). 
218 Id. at 1168, 1174-75. 
219 See id. at 1162-63 (“The overwhelming consensus in the legal community has been that 
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persuasively, that horizontal stare decisis is not constitutionally required, “but 
rather a matter of judicial policy.”220 
From a purely functional perspective, stare decisis is comparable to res 
judicata because both doctrines allow earlier court rulings to limit a litigant’s 
ability to contest certain issues in subsequent cases.221 Stare decisis can be even 
harsher for litigants because it can arise from cases in which they were not 
involved. “Precedent binds future litigants even though those future litigants 
were not afforded the opportunity to select the representative in the original, 
precedent-setting lawsuit; were not provided with notice of that original 
litigation; and were not afforded the opportunity to participate in that original 
litigation.”222 
Apart from their stare decisis effects, judicial opinions also may change the 
consequences of illegal or unauthorized government actions by subjecting 
government agents and officials to personal liability. Decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the pertinent circuit court of appeals can “clearly establish” 
governmental conduct as illegal or unconstitutional, allowing plaintiffs to 
overcome defendant officials’ qualified immunity223 and recover damages under 
§ 1983 or Bivens.224 District court opinions, in contrast, generally cannot give 
rise to “clearly established” law.225 The Supreme Court has approved of this 
 
having appellate courts issue nonprecedential decisions is not inconsistent with the exercise 
of the judicial power.”). 
220 Id. at 1175; see also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 
L.P., 277 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that courts need not follow unpublished 
opinions, but remain bound by the precedents upon which such opinions are based). 
221 Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1013 
(2003) (“[S]tare decisis often functions inflexibly in the federal courts, binding litigants in a 
way indistinguishable from nonparty preclusion.”); Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: 
Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 BYU L. REV. 597, 632 (“[F]rom 
the standpoint of due process, preclusion and precedent operate identically on nonparties.”); 
see also Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment 
on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 574-75 (1981) (pointing 
out that a Supreme Court ruling in a constitutional case governs nonparties, making it 
comparable to a broad class action). 
222 Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in 
Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1106. 
223 See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (noting that court of appeals 
decisions can “settle constitutional standards” for qualified immunity purposes); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity protects government 
officials unless their conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights”). 
224 See supra note 145 (describing the availability of monetary damages for constitutional 
violations under § 1983 and Bivens). 
225 Morley, supra note 25, at 502 n.55. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
forcefully declared, “[d]istrict court decisions cannot clearly establish a constitutional 
right. . . . [B]y themselves they cannot clearly establish the law because, while they bind the 
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approach without discussing whether a circuit may choose to allow district court 
rulings to do so.226  
The limited geographic scope and legal effects of lower court opinions cast 
doubt on the propriety of nationwide injunctions. There is a fundamental 
inconsistency in allowing a district court to certify a nationwide class and enter 
judgments and injunctions concerning the rights of people throughout the nation, 
while depriving the opinion and reasoning underlying those rulings—even if 
affirmed on appeal by a circuit court—any stare decisis effect (i.e., the force of 
law) in other circuits. 
One obvious response is that this argument proves too much. When a district 
court adjudicates the rights of litigants within its geographic jurisdiction in a 
nonclass case, it may enter a judgment and injunction despite the fact that its 
opinion lacks the force of law within its own district. Joseph Mead has 
thoroughly explored the puzzling inconsistencies that arise from our current 
system’s failure to afford stare decisis effect to district court rulings,227 and this 
doctrine warrants serious reconsideration. Even under current law, however, the 
fact that a circuit court’s opinions are not deemed binding in other jurisdictions 
strongly suggests that the judgments and injunctions based on those opinions—
and, by extension, the judgments and injunctions of district courts within that 
circuit—should be similarly limited.  
Lower courts should not be permitted to extend the effective reach of their 
legal determinations by certifying nationwide classes and issuing nationwide 
injunctions. The geographic scopes of each possible component of a court’s 
ruling—the people who may be bound to its judgments by res judicata, the 
parties who may be subject to its injunctions, and the people for whom its rulings 
constitute enforceable law as a matter of stare decisis—should be reasonably 
consistent. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
This Part offers a new approach to nationwide class certification and 
injunctions. Based on the considerations examined in the preceding Parts, 
nationwide classes in constitutional, statutory, and other similar challenges 
under Rule 23(b)(2) should be deemed presumptively invalid. This Part 
identifies four situations, however, in which such classes might be appropriate. 
 
parties by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, they are not authoritative as precedent and 
therefore do not establish the duties of nonparties.” Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 
(7th Cir. 1995). But see Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 
1988) (adopting opposite, minority approach). 
226 Camreta, 563 U.S. at 709 n.7 (“Many Courts of Appeals . . . decline to consider district 
court precedent when determining if constitutional rights are clearly established for purposes 
of qualified immunity.”). 
227 See generally Mead, supra note 22 (arguing that district court rulings generally should 
be afforded stare decisis effect). 
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Otherwise, district courts should certify circuit-wide classes under Rule 23(b)(2) 
in such public law cases.  
Courts should presumptively avoid certifying nationwide classes under Rule 
23(b)(2) when plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality or proper interpretation 
of a federal legal provision. Such classes are inconsistent with the structure of 
the federal judicial system, which contemplates that lower courts will not be able 
to give their legal rulings the force of law for all right holders nationwide. They 
prevent issues from percolating through the judicial system, deprive the 
Supreme Court of the opportunity to assess the consequences of competing 
interpretations of the Constitution or law in different jurisdictions, compel the 
Government to appeal every adverse ruling, effectively bar intercircuit 
nonacquiescence, and deprive litigants in other jurisdictions of the right to have 
their claims adjudicated under the law of their respective circuits.  
There are certain circumstances, however, in which nationwide class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and nationwide injunctions against federal 
agencies or officials might be warranted. Rather than definitively staking out a 
position, this Article offers ideas as a springboard for further study. First, 
borrowing standards from other legal contexts, the district court should assess 
whether the plaintiffs’ arguments are based on “clearly established” law solely 
under Supreme Court precedents,228 or whether “fairminded jurists” would be 
unable to disagree about the challenged legal provision’s invalidity or proper 
interpretation.229 The Supreme Court generally prohibits lower courts from 
“conduct[ing] a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”230 Here, however, the court 
would not be assessing the merits to decide whether to certify a class, but rather 
to determine its scope. In cases where binding Supreme Court precedent patently 
establishes that a legal provision is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid beyond 
reasonable dispute, the relitigation contemplated by Mendoza may be 
unnecessary, and certification of a nationwide class is more appropriate. 
Second, a court should consider the nature of the claimed right. When a 
plaintiff asserts an “indivisible” right, meaning that it would be impossible to 
grant him or her relief without effectively extending such relief to other right 
holders,231 as well, then it may be appropriate for the court to certify a class—
including a nationwide class, if necessary—encompassing all such right holders. 
Because class certification would not affect the scope of the court’s 
injunction,232 concerns about the court inappropriately expanding its powers 
 
228 Cf. supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing how decisions from the 
Supreme Court and circuit courts can “clearly establish” conduct as unconstitutional). 
229 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
230 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
231 See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing how granting a single plaintiff 
relief for an “indivisible” right necessarily benefits third-party nonlitigants). 
232 See, e.g., Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1104 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Because relief for 
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generally should not arise. Moreover, should the government defendants prevail, 
they would be able to invoke collateral estoppel against any similar claims in the 
future.  
Third, a court should consider the nature of the alleged infirmity with the 
underlying legal provision. If the alleged defect is that the provision is 
unnecessarily burdensome, then the nature of the underlying constitutional right 
may counsel in favor of broad, nationwide class certification. Requiring other 
right holders to file independent federal lawsuits to enforce their rights would 
burden those rights even further. The need to avoid constitutionally undue 
burdens upon the exercise of fundamental rights may outweigh the 
Government’s interest in retaining the power to relitigate issues and discretion 
over whether to appeal an adverse ruling. 
Finally, the court should conduct an implicit preliminary severability 
analysis.233 “[I]f the challenged provision can coherently be applied to everyone 
but the plaintiffs, and the court determines that the entity that enacted the 
provision would have wanted to ‘save’ as much of it as possible,” then the court 
should refuse nationwide class certification.234 In contrast, if “the court 
determines that the entity that enacted the legal provision would not have wanted 
to have two conflicting sets of rules simultaneously enforced on different 
segments of the public, or that it would be impossible as a practical matter to 
apply different rules to different people,” then nationwide certification is likely 
warranted.235 While nationwide classes and injunctions implicate numerous 
serious issues, these principles can provide a starting point for determining when 
such relief is most appropriate. 
Thus, in the majority of constitutional and statutory challenges under Rule 
23(b)(2), nationwide class certification will likely be inappropriate. This leaves 
the question of how broadly a district court should define a class that meets the 
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) in such cases. Certifying circuit-wide 
classes offers the best balance between limiting the power of lower courts and 
practical considerations, such as judicial economy and minimizing unnecessary 
burdens on litigants.  
 
the named plaintiffs in this case would also necessarily extend to all federal inmates, the 
district court did not err in granting wide-ranging injunctive relief prior to certifying a 
nationwide class of plaintiffs.”); Bailey v. Peterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1963) 
(“We find it unnecessary to determine, however, whether this action was properly brought 
under Rule 23(a), for whether or not appellants may properly represent all Negroes similarly 
situated, the decree to which they are entitled is the same. . . . The very nature of the rights 
appellants seek to vindicate requires that the decree run to the benefit not only of appellants 
but also for all persons similarly situated.”). 
233 The modern standards for severability are set forth in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-08 (2012), and Alaska Airlines, Inc. 
v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987). 
234 Morley, supra note 25, at 552. 
235 Id. 
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A circuit-wide approach emphasizes each circuit court as a more important 
source of law than the individual judicial districts within it. Limiting Rule 
23(b)(2) classes and injunctions to the circuit in which a district court sits gives 
that court’s judgment and injunction the same geographic range as the circuit 
court opinions upon which they most immediately rest. At the same time, the 
Government preserves the opportunity to relitigate legal issues in other circuits, 
allowing those courts to reach their own conclusions and facilitating percolation 
and intercircuit diversity—important considerations underlying Mendoza.236 
The Government lacks a comparable interest in ensuring that each district court 
within a circuit has an opportunity to interpret and apply that circuit’s governing 
precedents for itself. Adopting a circuit-based approach to class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(2) and injunctions strikes an appropriate compromise between 
Mendoza and Califano.  
CONCLUSION 
Nationwide injunctions have become an important means through which 
litigants on both sides of the political spectrum seek to enforce their 
understanding of the Constitution. By obtaining a favorable ruling from a single 
trial court judge—sometimes effectively handpicked through careful choice of 
venue—a litigant may have a statute or regulation definitively construed or even 
invalidated throughout the entire nation. The Supreme Court approved of this 
approach, albeit cautiously, in Califano.237 
Nationwide injunctions nevertheless run contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in 
Mendoza.238 The Mendoza Court held that the Government should not be bound 
to the first decision—particularly the first adverse decision—on a legal issue, 
and effectively forced to appeal every adverse ruling against it.239 Limiting the 
legal consequences of district court rulings in this manner is consistent with 
Congress’s intent in granting such courts limited geographic jurisdiction. 
Mendoza also sought to promote the quality of judicial decision-making by 
allowing the Supreme Court to consider the practical consequences of different 
possible interpretations of a constitutional provision or statute in various circuits 
before definitively adopting one for the entire nation. It also ensured that most 
rulings of national significance would be made by the Supreme Court, a collegial 
institution in which decision makers can be affirmatively confronted with 
potential defects or oversights in their reasoning, rather than a single, 
overburdened trial-level judge.  
 
236 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984) (stating that the government has 
an interest in knowing “whether a court will bar relitigation of [an] issue in a later case” so 
that it can “determin[e] whether or not to appeal an adverse decision”). 
237 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1979). 
238 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162. 
239 Id. 
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Based on the structure of the judicial system; the statutes, rules, and other 
policies governing class actions; and the limited stare decisis effect of lower 
court rulings, district courts should certify nationwide classes and issue 
nationwide injunctions only in certain situations. Such injunctions are 
appropriate, in light of the concerns set forth in Mendoza, where: Supreme Court 
precedent (without intermediating circuit-level precedents) directly renders the 
challenged legal provision indisputably invalid or otherwise conclusively 
resolves the legal issue; the plaintiff seeks to enforce an indivisible right or 
contends that the challenged provision is unduly burdensome; or the entity that 
enacted the provision at issue would not have intended for it to continue being 
applied if certain people had to be exempted from it. Applying this framework 
would increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of nationwide injunctions 
by ensuring that courts issue them on an objective and predictable basis, and 
only when important interests require such an extraordinary form of relief. 
